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M. L. SEARS, JOSEPH BEHLING, 
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DER, on behalf of themselves and all 
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A. STEPHEN DIRKS, COUNCIL 
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CORDER, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
An action brought by the Appellants asking for de-
claratory and injunctive relief brought on behalf of the 
Appellants and all other persons similarly situated as both 
taxpayers of the City of Ogden and as residents and home-
owners in the dedicated subdivision of Ogden City. 
Case No. 
13647 
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The Appellants have sought a determination as to 
the validity of an ordinance passed by the Ogden City 
Council closing and vacating a public street which the 
Appellants believe was a part of a dedicated subdivision 
known as the Argonne Park Plat, and the giving of the 
closed and vacated public street to the Board of Educa-
tion of Ogden City without any compensation whatso-
ever being paid to the City of Ogden or to the Appellants, 
wherein the Board of Education of Ogden City was, and 
is, the only abuttting landowner on said dedicated and 
said closed and vacated public street; and whether said 
action by the City of Ogden and by the Ogden City Coun-
cil was a valid exercise of the authority and power of the 
Ogden City Council and; further, whether the closing off 
and taking away of a dedicated street in an allegedly 
private plotted addition without the consent of the quali-
fied electors of the City of Ogden or the homeowners of 
a blighted subdivision without compensation constitutes 
the taking of property without due process of law. 
The Appellants are seeking the reversal of a lower 
court decision wherein the Respondents were favored 
with the dismissal of the Appellants', then Plaintiffs' 
action. The lower court at a hearing on a motion for 
temporary restraining order and on a complaint for de-
claratory judgment held that the action of the Ogden City 
Council in the closing of the street and the giving of the 
same by Quit Claim deed to the Board of Education of 
Ogden City was not an abuse of authority o fthe Ogden 
City Council acting for the City of Ogden, and that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 
City of Ogden had complied with the charter upon which 
it was founded together with the statutes of the State 
of Utah which set forth the procedures as to public hear-
ings and as to the procedure for the vacating of a public 
street where the exigency existed in the public interest 
and with public good and welfare. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek by defendaing this action on 
appeal a sustaining of the dismissal in the lower court 
and an order from the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah dismissing the action of the Appellants as set forth 
in their demand to this Court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 27, 1973, a petition per letter was received 
from William L. Garner, Superintendent of the Board 
of Education of Ogden City, requesting that the Ogden 
City Council close 29th Street between Tyler Avenue 
and Harrison Boulevard, which street divides the school 
building complex from the athletic field complex of the 
Ogden High School, (R-85). This petition did come be-
fore the Ogden City Council on August 2, 1973. At this 
time, the City Manager, Richard L. Larsen, was given 
the responsibility to make a study concerning the possible 
closing as requested by the Board of Education of Ogden 
City, (R-119-20). Mr. Larsen requested his staff, includ-
ing the Traffic Co-ordinator, the Ogden City Planning 
Staff, and the Public Works Department, to give to him 
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a preliminary opinion as to the possible effects of a clos-
ure of 29th Street, (Defendants' Exhibit 2) (R-86). On 
September 6, 1973, the petition for the closing and vacat-
ing of 29th Street was once again brought before the 
Council and was referred to the Ogden City Planning 
Commission for its study and recommendations. On No-
vember 7,1973, the request to vacate that portion of 29th 
Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue 
was on the agenda of the Ogden City Planning Commis-
sion. On December 3, 1973, the Ogden City Planning 
Commission received a memorandum from Graham F. 
Shirra, Planning Director of the Ogden City Planning 
Commission, Rulon H. Sorenson, Director of Public 
Works, and Donald Godfrey, Traffic Engineer, in regard 
to the vacation of 29th Street through the Ogden High 
School campus at which time the pros and cons of the 
closing of the street were discussed without a firm recom-
mendation either for or against closing being the conclu-
sion of the staff after extensive surveying, (Defendants' 
Exhibit 3) (R-46-48). 
Meanwhile, on November 29, 1973, an ordinance was 
proposed at a regular meeting of the Council of Ogden 
City for the vacating of 29th Street as a public street 
between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. Decem-
ber 20, 1973, was set as the time for the public hearing 
on the proposed ordinance to close 29th Street, which 
public hearing was such that the Ogden City Planning 
Commission and the Ogden City Council did hold a joint 
hearing with the public at Ogden High School adjacent 
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to the street proposed to be vacated, (R-19-20) (R-102). 
On January 10, 1974, the Ogden City Council did enter-
tain a motion to vacate 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, which motion was passed 
and was based upon the public benefit, for the following 
reasons: 
1. It will improve the safety of vehicles 
and children on Harrison Boulevard by allowing 
relocation of the ball diamond and tennis courts 
so balls will not go into the boulevard with child-
ren going after them. 
2. It will improve the flow of traffic by 
reducing the crossings at 29th Street and Harri-
son Boulevard where there is no traffic light, 
and moves the traffic to 28th and 30th Streets at 
Harrison Boulevard where traffic signals are lo-
cated. 
3. It will increase the safety of students 
and those home activities at Ogden High School 
by making it so they can get to school without 
crossing a public street. 
4. It substantially increases the safety and 
convenience of students and faculty of Ogden 
High School by removing a public street from 
this campus allowing safe and easy access from 
the school to its other facilities. 
5. It doesn't interfere with access to the 
other land east of the school or elsewhere, (R-
19-20). 
Pursuant to the Ogden City charter and the laws of 
the State of Utah, the ordinance, having been voted upon, 
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was thereafter ordered to be published and to become 
final twenty days after its final publication. The Board 
of Education of Ogden City is the abutting landowner 
on both sides of 29th Street between Tyler Avenue and 
Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Weber County, Utah; and, 
as such, is the individual to whom the property would 
be deeded upon its vacation by Ogden City according to 
law, (R-19-20). 
The Ogden City Planning Commission, in a regular 
session on January 2, 1974, did adopt a resolution that 
the request of the Board of Education of Ogden City for 
the closure of the 29th Street area be denied, in that the 
advantages for the closure of said street were not suffi-
cient to warrant a closure of an established street, (De-
fendants' Exhibit 5) (R-100). The Planning Commission 
Chairman did, however, conclude that the reason for the 
denial request and its granting by the Ogden City Plan-
ning Commission was not because of any feelings either 
pro or con for the project but that they did feel that 
they had not had sufficient information to make an ade-
quate study so that they could have a more proper rec-
ommendation to the Ogden City Council, (R-103). 
Great opposition was voiced against the proposed 
project for the vacating of 29th Street, based upon con-
clusions that 29th Street was the lifeline for those citizens 
of East 29th Street to traverse to and from their homes 
and their businesses, but that such an objection was not 
substantial inasmuch as other routes on 28th Street and 
30th Street existed, which streets could take the addi-
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tional flow of traffic and thereby not develop into a traf-
fic problem by the vacating of 29th Street. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE AN ABSO-
LUTE PERPETUAL RIGHT IN A DEDI-
CATED STREET. 
The Appellants have alleged that they are persons 
who are homeowners or are purchasers of lots which 
were originally dedicated in the Argonne Park Plat, which 
plat dedication was to have been recorded on February 
1, 1921, in the Weber County Recorder's office. The full 
extent of the dedication plat of the Argonne Park was 
not brought to a factual determination at the hearing 
on the temporary restraining order on February 7, 1974, 
because of the court's determination that the City of 
Ogden had fully complied with all requirements for the 
vacating of a street and, as such, with the District Court 
subsequently granting a motion to dismiss said complaint. 
The Argonne Park addition, however, as reduced here, 
indicated that theaddition covered an area from Harrison 
past Polk Avenue between 28th Street and 29th Street 
in Ogden. The area between 28th Street and 29th Street 
and Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue consisted of 
the area on which the Ogden High School was built in 
the mid 1930's, (opened in September, 1937). The prop-
erty south of 29th Street between Harrison Boulevard 
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9 
and Tyler Avenue to and including 30th Street consisted 
likewise of property owned by the Board of Education of 
Ogden City on which the athletic fields were located, (R-
18 (See Supreme Court Exhibit 1). 
The Appellants cite Tuttle vs. Sowadzkin, et al, 126 
P. 959 (1912), which case they make reference to, as 
being the determining case which declared the ownership 
rights of individual lot holders in a dedicated plat. This 
Court considered a fact situation where Salt Lake County 
had received the dedication of a street entitled Wabash 
Avenue between State Street and 2nd East Street. The 
county after receiving the dedication of said street, did 
not improve said street and pursuant to Comp. Laws 
1907, Section 1116, failed to use or work on said road 
for a period of five years, and as such did abandon said 
dedicated street, and as such did lose the dedication of 
the same. The Court in this case was making a ruling as 
to subsequent purchasers of property abutting said dedi-
cated portion of street as to their rights as abutting land-
owners subsequent to the abandonment by Salt Lake 
County of said dedicated portion of the street. This 
Court held that there was a distinction between the own-
ers of property abutting said street prior to the abandon-
ment by Salt Lake County of said portion of said street, 
and those owners of property subsequent to said aban-
donment, in that it found that there existed two ease-
ments, a private easement and a public easement; and 
further held that a private eastment in a highway will 
continue to exist after the public easement has become 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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extinct only in favor of those who owned a private ease-
ment, when the public one was extinguished, since, while 
a private easement may survive the public easement, it 
cannot "survive" unless both existed at the same time. 
In this case, contrary to what Appellants perceive the 
holding to be, the court dealt with abutting landowners, 
those owners being property owners of record who owned 
property which is adjacent to or abuts on a street. In 
this regard, they did not make reference to a whole sub-
division or a whole dedicated plat area, but only to those 
individuals who own abutting property on a dedicated 
street. 
This Court further held that those abutting land-
owners who owned the property prior to the abandon-
ment by the public entity did own and possess a private 
easement on said portion of said highway or street, which 
public easement gave to them a right which could not be 
taken from them without due compensation for the value 
of said right. 
In the case now before this Court, the abutting land-
owner is the petitioner who requested that the City Coun-
cil of Ogden City and all Defendants vacate 29th Street 
between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, (R-85). 
This would seem to negate the responsibility of Ogden 
City giving just compensation to the abutting landowner 
when thea butting landowner is the petitioner requesting 
vacation of said street, and as such, who is not making 
a demand against said City for compensation. Further, 
the petitioner is the same individual who, by modifying 
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29th Street into a full campus, is in effect relinquishing 
its right of private easement over its own property. 
In Appellants' brief, Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County, 
104 P. I l l , (1909), was cited, which case was a predeces-
sor to Tuttle vs. Sowadzki, cited supra, wherein the Court 
did hold and make a distinction as to the public use being 
that which was dedicated to the City or the County as 
a street and that a conveyance in fee for said dedicated 
purpose is a limited or a determinable fee and is created 
only for a special purpose or purposes only. Once again, 
this cited case deals with abutting landowners, and as 
such explores the rights of said abutting landowners to 
be compensated and to have their rights declared. 
The Appellants rely on Boskovich, et al. vs. Midvale 
City Corporation, 243 P. 2d 435, (1952), which case is 
grossly similar to the case now before this Court in that 
a portion of a street was vacated upon the petition of the 
Board of Education. In the Boskovich case, the City of 
Midvale failed to follow statutory procedure in the giving 
of a proper notice, the holding of a fair hearing, and the 
failure to consider substantial rights of those involved. 
This Court further ruled, even if there may have been 
proper due process roceedings, that the public and private 
easements were distinct, and that the private easement 
would remain and would have to be compensated for in 
relation to those individuals within the subdivision plat 
dedication, even though such compensation may be 
meager as such. In that case, the facts distinguish it 
from the instant case in that the Plaintiff, Boskovich, re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sided next to a school owned by the Board of Education 
and abutted on a street that dead-ended into an 11-foot 
alleyway. The vacation of the abutting street in front 
of the school was such as to cul-de-sac the Plaintiff. The 
Court held that the Plaintiff would still have his right 
of private easement because of the extraordinary circum-
stance of having been dead-ended on a street which had 
been to him a street which would, or could, be traversed 
along that dedicated and vacated street to an alleyway 
and along said alleyway to an exit from the subdivision. 
The instant case distinguishes itself from theBoskovich 
case in that the abutting landowner, who is the Board of 
Education of Ogden City, is not so located that it would 
cul-de-sac any of the Plaintiffs' nor prevent their access 
along and over streets adjacent thereto, which streets 
because of the closing of the instant street would not be 
brought to an excessive traffic condition. Further, the 
Appellants rely on the fact that the dedicated street is 
wholly within a subdivision dedication existing from 1921, 
which fact relates only to approximately 32.13 feet of a 
99 foot right-of-way along 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, (see Supreme Court Ex-
hibit 1). Thus, the facts that there is no cul-de-sacing of 
the Plaintiffs and that any portion of the dedicated 
streetway is only partial dedication would distinguish 
it from the Boskovich case. This Court in Boskovich did 
set as authority for its finding the Sowadzki cases where 
the issue was as to abutting landowners and where this 
was the main issue in action without an extension of the 
same to all the members of the subdivision and all the 
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members of the area and all the citizens of the City of 
Ogden, which extension, if permitted, would in effect, pre-
vent the City of Ogden, the City of Salt Lake City, or 
any city or county public entity from acting in the best 
interest and for the public good of the citizens of those 
respective public entities. 
The instant case is one where the charter provisions 
of Ogden City having been complied with and the later 
state statutory sections of 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended 1953, and the series of statutes commencing 
thereafter with 10-8-8.1, which statutory sections were 
enacted in 1955, were not in and of themselves incon-
sistent to deprive those involved with a reasonable notice, 
a fair hearing, and a substantial opportunity to consider 
the rights of all. 
The Appellants attempt further to make a distinction 
that in Stringham vs. Salt Lake City, 201 P. 2d 758, 
(1949), and the further citing of McQuillan, Municipal 
Corporation, 2nd edition, Volume 3, Section 981, p. 217, 
and Thompson vs. Smith, 155 Vt. 367,154 S. E. 579, where 
it is attempted to isolate the privilege of the City being 
to control the streets for the benefit of the entire public, 
which privilege is distinguished from a right in said streets 
even after dedication. This argument goes to the effect 
that the City as at a loss to vacate any street, alley, or 
thoroughfare unless there is a public exigency or facts 
which would indicate that the public would be protected. 
In the instant case, such was the factual situation where 
the public rights and interest were to be benefited not 
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only to those Plaintiffs, but to all citizens of Ogden City 
and all citizens whose children did attend the school com-
plex located adjacent to 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue. These citizens were to be 
benefited not only through protection in preventing ser-
ious accidents to result in the crossing of said street, but 
to have the beneficial opportunity to have an athletic 
complex that is not separated by a street but is joined 
for the benefit of the students, as well as those in the 
surrounding neighborhoods and the City public in gen-
eral, (R-20). 
The Appellants feel that the lower court erred when 
it cited Stone vs. Salt Lake City, 356 P. 2d 631, (1960). 
It was, however, cited as an illustration where the Court 
held: 
There is no merit in this case insofar as statutes 
are concerned. I believe the statutes have been 
ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court in Stone 
vs. Salt Lake City, and other decisions in 1960, 
and later. There is no question that a legislative 
body, either County Commissioners or City 
Fathers can vacate dedicated streets if they fol-
low normal procedures; otherwise, government 
can never change and that this can be done (R-
123). 
In the Stone case this Court ruled on a fact situation 
when the city of Salt Lake City conveyed two parcels of 
city-owned land for the construction, by the United States 
Government, of a Federal Building; and the Court held 
that, "the essential of procedural requirements, sale by 
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city of its land is that there be notice, a reasonable op-
portunity for those interested to appear and be heard, 
and fairness in the procedure in connection with the sale." 
This was the sole purpose why the lower Court did cite 
the Stone case, and as such, the Court merely wanted 
to show that there had been a reasonable procedure fol-
lowed consistent with the charter of Ogden City and the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT DEPRIVED 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellants cite numerous cases commencing with 
Hall vs. North Ogden City, 166 P. 2d 221, (1946), and a 
series of cases commencing with 1909 up to 1970 in an 
attempt to show by these Utah cases aswell as the cases 
of other jurisdictions, that there exists the need to fully 
compensate all property owners who may be involved 
when a city, county, or any municipal form of government 
exercises dominion over the rights of streets and thorough-
fares. The cases were cited to show that due compensa-
tion must be given to those individuals affected by a va-
cating of a street or thoroughfare, which street or thor-
oughfare these same people were to have had a property 
right in. None of these cases fit into the fact situation 
that is presently before this Court where a street running 
between property owned by the Board of Education of 
Ogden City, which vacated street has as its sole and only 
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abutting landowners this same Board of Education of 
Ogden City, which Board of Education being the Peti-
tioner, is asking for the vacation of said street. It is a 
given and foregone conclusion at law in the State of Utah 
that property may not be taken without due process re-
sulting in due compensation to thoce individuals who 
have a property right in that property which is being 
taken from them. 
The Appellants submit the argument that all indi-
viduals throughout Ogden City, as well as the Plaintiffs, 
have a right in said street, which would, under this con-
clusion, mean that any street, alley, or any thoroughfare 
with a public right were to be vacated by the City of 
Ogden or any municipality, that all citizens of that city 
would have a property right existing within themselves 
which property right would have value attached to it 
that through a condemnation action would be such as to 
compensate each individual citizen of a municipality. It 
is more reasonable to look at the fact situation that is 
before this Court, which fact situation shows and is traced 
tto the earlier decisions on dedicated streets as far back 
as the Sowadzki cases, supra. There the rights of adjoin-
ing or abutting landowners were the only rights which 
were to be fruitful in receiving compensation when said 
rights were taken from those abutting landowners by 
method of legislative action. In Section 10-8-8.5, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended 1955, and as enacted by 
the Legislature in 1955, the effect of the vacation of a 
street is to relinquish the City's fee therein, "but the 
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right-of-way and easements therein, if any, of any lot 
owner and the franchise rights of any public utility shall 
not be impaired thereby." This can only be interpreted 
to mean the single abutting owner's rights-of-way shall 
not be impaired nor his easement taken from him. The 
instant case is such that the abutting landowner is the 
petitioner for vacation of said street and as such is re-
linquishing his rights. 
The Appellants cite the dedication plat terminology 
that said streets in said dedication plat shall "remain 
public thoroughfares forever." What of the needs of 
public exigency? What of the rights vested in the cities 
by the legislatures of both the state and the city, grant-
ing to the municipalities the right of condemnation and 
the right to vacate streets for the public benefit and in 
the public interest. It is submitted that if there is an 
individual having a right to said vacated street, which 
right is paramount to that of the City of Ogden, than that 
individual should be compensated; but that inidividual 
should not be, as the Appellants indicate, all citizens simi-
larly situated, and all citizens that have traversed along 
29th Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Ave-
nue. The reason would have it that only those abutting 
landowners who are affected should receive compensa-
tion, consistent with the Sowadzki precedent cases. 
Further, as cited at another place within this brief, 
only the 32.13 feet on the north side of 29th Street of a 
street which is divided down at center in a 49.5' median 
line was part of the Plaintiffs' and Appellants' question 
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as to a dedication to the City in 1921 and subsequent to 
the vacation of that portion in 1974, (see Supreme Court 
Exhibit 1). The whole of the 99 feet is not in question. 
The whole of the 99 feet of 29th Street was based on other 
Quit Claim deeds given to the City of Ogden over the 
years, and not solely from those individuals who did 
acquire whatever rights they might have in the Argonne 
Park addition to Ogden City. 
Appellants cite as another argument that the agen-
cies of the Defendant, namely, the Ogden City Planning 
Commission, did fail to hold a public hearing consistent 
with the Municipal Planning Enabling Act, 10-9-19, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, et seq., which act itself provides 
for uniform planning, the holding of public hearings, and 
the development of communities in a way that is con-
sistent with the maintaining of orderly communities. 
Through the testimony of the chairman of the Ogden 
City Planning Commission it was established that a joint 
meeting and hearing with the Ogden City Council was 
held on December 20, 1973, as per the minutes of the 
meeting of the Council of Ogden City on that same date, 
(R-19). After said public hearing, the Ogden City Plan-
ning Commission did recommendf to the Ogden City 
Council that said petition for vacation be denied, (R-
100). The recommendation for denial was based on the 
fact that there had been a possible lack of information 
given to the Ogden City Planning Commission members 
for them to make a positive finding, (R-102). 
Appellants with delight cite that the Ogden City 
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Planning Director, Graham Shirra, the Public Works Di-
rector, Rulon Sorenson, the Traffic Engineer, Donald 
Godfrey, and R. L. Larsen, the Ogden City Manager, 
opposed the vacating of 29th Street. The fact as cited 
in the testimony in the transcript of said hearing was 
that Graham Shirra, Rulon Sorenson, and Donald God-
frey joining in a letter dated December 3, 1973, which 
letter is marked as evidence, (Defendants' Exhibit 3), 
wherein it is suggested that because of the pros and cons 
that the above three gentlemen and staff members of 
Ogden City's Planning, Public Works, and Traffic De-
partment, recommended neither adoption of the petition 
or denial of the petition but stated that the City Council 
of Ogden City could decide in what direction the citizens 
of Ogden would be best benefited, which fact is their pre-
rogative, (R-96) (R-108-109) (R-110). 
The City Manager, R. L. Larsen, based upon his 
position as a member of the Ogden City Planning Com-
mission, did request denial of said petition based on his 
reason that he lacked complete information for him to 
make a proper decision. 
For some reason or other, the Ogden Standard Ex-
aminer editorials are cited by the Appellants as well as 
petitions indicating the feelings of many citizens east of 
29th Street, 28th Street, and 30th Street above the va-
cated 20th Street section. The citing of these particular 
feelings do not represent the need of the public, which 
was considered by the City Council, which represents 
not only those citizens on 29th Street but the citizenry of 
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the whole of the City of Ogden, and as such, are merely 
documents as so entitled and are of no probative value. 
In Robinette vs. Price, 280 Pacific 736, (1929), in a 
case where a street was closed and the property owners' 
means of ingress, egress were interfered with, this Court 
held that merely the depriving of the Plaintiff of his 
direct route to and from the main business portion of the 
City causing a depreciation of property value as well as 
rendering rental more difficult in view of decreasing 
rental value did not constitute compensable damages. 
Further, in the Springville Banking Company vs. 
Burton, 349 Pacific 2d 157, a 1960 case which itself dealt 
with eminent domain, held, in a fact situation dealing 
with the State Tax Commission impairing the right of 
ingress and egress from Plaintiffs' property along a state 
highway, that "if the sovereign exercises its police power 
reasonably and for the good of all the people when con-
structing highways, consequential damages such as those 
alleged here are not compensable; on the other hand, if 
public officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably causing, 
for example, total destruction of the means to get in and 
out of one's property, without any reasonable justification 
for doing so in the public interest, in a manner that im-
poses a special burden on one not shared by the public 
generally, principles of equity no doubt could be evoked 
to prevent threatened action of such character or to re-
move any instrumentality born of such conduct." The 
foregoing cases, although dealing with condemnation ac-
tions of the State of Utah, are such that compensation 
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was denied where private rights existed for both ingress 
and egress, which is what the Appellants are attempting 
to have this Court rule upon. These cases stand as prece-
dent when no compensation should be granted where the 
the mere ingress and egress of a direct route is interfered 
with and when there are additional routes of travel into 
that subdivision or platted area in question. Therefore, 
it is submitted by the Respondents that although it is 
believed that only the abutting landowners in this situa-
tion shoud be compensated for any loss of a private right, 
the fact of ingress and egress for other owners within this 
same area is not a compensable right; and the facts, that 
there were adequate notices, proper hearings and strict 
adherence to the charter of the City of Ogden and the laws 
governing the vacating of a street, are such that they 
have been complied with, and in no way have the rights 
of those other individuals been abused or interfered with. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO FACTUAL FINDING THAT 
RESPONDENTS HAVE ABUSED THEIR 
DISCRETION OR ACTED FRAUDULENT 
OR IN ANY ILLEGAL MANNER IN THE 
VACATING OF SAID STREET. 
In the vacating of 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, the lower Court did hold 
in its bench ruling that all applicable laws had been com-
plied with and that the finding of the Court was that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
this had been al egislative action and that the judiciary 
had no right to set aside the said vacation unless the 
statutes and ordinances of the City of Ogden had been 
abused. In Springville Banking Company vs. Burton, 
supra, the Court held that if the public officials did act 
arbitrarily or unreasonably then question would be raised 
as to the act in question. In Rhees vs. D. E. Mund, 245 P. 
2d 284, (1952), in an Arizona Supreme Court decision, the 
Court held, "The City Council of the City of Phoenix 
in vacating and abandoning the alley in question acted 
in a legislative capacity, and the Court cannot question 
the wisdom or discretion or advisability of its action ex-
cept for fraud or other illegality or absence of jurisdiction 
to abandon." Further, in People vs. City of Pomona, 200 
P. 2d 176, (1949), the Court held in a case involving the 
vacating of a street that Appellant did have the burden 
of demonstrating that sufficient evidence was produced 
to show that the City Council abused its discretion in 
vacating the public street for purposes other than for 
public good and welfare. 
The instant case exemplifies that the City Council 
of the City of Ogden did exercise proper discretion in 
vacating the street for proper public purposes and for 
the benefit of all citizens. The charter of the City of 
Ogden, being the charter law under which the City of 
Ogden must function, and the laws of the State of Utah, 
with regard to the vacating of a street for a public pur-
pose, are consistent. Once a hearing has been held after 
proper notice has been given to all citizens and the rights 
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of all have been taken into consideration, the City Coun-
cil of the City of Ogden does have authority and did, 
through a legislative action, vote for the closure of 29th 
Street between Harrison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, 
thus, not acting arbitrarily or unreasonably or in fraud 
or illegally or in absence of jurisdiction in the carrying 
out of this public interest action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hereby respectfully submitted to the Court that 
the issues are squarely met, that the Respondents have 
complied with the laws of the State of Utah and have 
complied with the granting to all parties reasonable no-
tice, a fair public hearing, and a consideration of all issues 
relating to the vacation of 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue in Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah. There is no evidence that there had even been 
any abuse of discretion or that there had been fraud or 
illegality on the part of the Respondents. The charter of 
Ogden City, together with the laws of the State of Utah 
have been fully complied with. The only cases in point 
deal with abutting landowners where an abutting land-
owner did raise a complaint and where this court ruled 
in favor of the abutting landowner and directed that due 
compensation, how much or how little, not being resolved, 
be tendered to the abutting landowners. Our situation 
is one where the abutting landowner is a party requesting 
dedication. He receives a deed to that property belonging 
to the City of Ogden which abuts on his property form-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
erly known as that land between 29th Street and Harri-
son Boulevard. 
It is requested by the Respondents that the com-
plaint and petition before this Court of the Appellants 
be dismissed and the lower Court's decision in this matter 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. KENT BACHMAN 
Chief Asst. Corporate Counsel 
527 Municipal Bldg. 
P. 0. Box 1639 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Attorney for Respondents 
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